вторник, 28 апреля 2015 г.

Iris Murdoch "SARTRE Romantic Rationalist"


       La Nauseé was Sartre's first novel, and it contains all his main interests except the political ones. It is his most densely philosophical novel. It concerns itself with freedom and bad faith, the character of the bourgeoisie, the phenomenology of perception, the nature of thought, of memory, of art. These topics are all raised as consequent upon a certain discovery, of metaphysical interest, which is made by the hero, Antoine Roquentin. This discovery, put in philosophical jargon, is the discovery that the
world is contingent, and that we are related to it discursively and not intuitively.
       Roquentin is standing on the sea shore. He has picked up a pebble which he is about to throw into the sea. He looks at the pebble - and a curious sickly horror overcomes him.. He drops it and goes away. There follow other experiences of the same sort. A fear of objects invades him-but he cannot decide whether it is he or they that have changed. Looking at a glass of beer, at the braces of the café patron, he is filled with a 'sweetish sort of disgust' (une espece d'ecourement douceatre).
He looks at his own face in a mirror, and suddenly it seems to him inhuman, fishlike. He subsequently makes the discovery: there are no adventures. Adventures are stories, and one does not live a story. One tells it later, one can only see it from the outside. The meaning of an adventure comes from its conclusion; future passions give colour to the events. But when one is inside an event,
one is not thinking of it. One can live or tell; not both at once. When one is living, nothing happens. There are no real beginnings. The future is not already there. Things happen, but not in the way that Roquentin had liked to imagine when he believed in adventures. What he had wanted was the impossible: that the moments of his life should follow each other like those of a remembered life, or with the inevitability of the notes of a familiar tune. He thinks, too, of his own work: he is
writing the life of the Marquis de Rollebon. Yet this story which Roquentin is unravelling from letters and documents is not the real life which Rollebon lived. If he cannot even retain his own past, thinks Roquentin, how can he save that of another? He sees it all in a flash: the past does not really exist at all. There are the traces, the appearances-and behind them nothing. Or rather, what there is is the present, his own present-and what is this? The 'I' that goes on existing is merely the ever-lengthening stuff of gluey sensations and vague fragmentary thoughts.
     Roquentin visits the picture gallery, and looks at the self-satisfied faces of the bourgeoisie. These people never felt that their existences were stale and unjustified. They lived surrounded by institutions of state and family, and borne up by a consciousness of their own claims and virtues. Their faces are eclatant de droit - blazing with right. Their lives had a real given meaning, or so they
imagined; and here they are, with all that added sense of necessity with which the painter's thought can endow them. Roquentin's own recent experience has given him a special sense of the bad faith of these attempts to clothe the nakedness of existence with such trimmings of meaning. Salauds! he thinks, as he returns to his own nauseé.
   This malaise now moves towards a climax, and its metaphysical character is made more clear. Roquentin is staring at a seat in a tramcar .. 'I murmur: it's a seat, as a sort of exorcism. But the word remains on my lips : it refuses to go and rest upon the thing ... ' 'Things are delivered from their names. They are there, grotesque, stubborn, huge, and it seems crazy to call them seats or
to say anything whatever about them.' He continues his reflections in the public park: though he has often said, for instance, 'seagull " he has never before felt that that which he named existed. Before he had thought in terms of classes and kinds; now what is before him is a particular existing thing. 'Existence had lost the inoffensive air of an abstract category: it was the very stuff of things.' He fixes his eyes upon the root of a chestnut tree. Then comes the final and fullest revelation. ' I understood that there was no middle way between nonexistence and this swooning abundance. What exists at
all must exist to this point: to the point of mouldering, of bulging, of obscenity. In another world, circles and melodies· retain their pure and rigid contours. But existence is a degeneration.'
   Roquentin, who has abandoned his book on Rollebon, decides to leave. He sits in the cafe and listens for the last time to his favourite gramophone record: a Negress singing Some of these days. Often before, while listening to this melody, he has been struck by its pure, untouched, rigorous necessity. The notes follow one another, inevitably, away in another world. Like the circle, they do
not exist. They are. The melody says: you must be like me. You must suffer in rhythm. I too, I wanted to be, thinks Roquentin. He thinks of the Jew who wrote the song, the Negress who sings it. Then he has another revelation. These two are sawed, washed of the sin of existing. Why should he not be saved too? He will create something, a novel perhaps, which shall be beautiful and hard as steel, and will make people ashamed of their superfluity. Writing it, that will be a stale day to
day task.

понедельник, 27 апреля 2015 г.

From "Auden and Christianity" by ARTHUR KIRSCH

Introduction

In a review written in 1941, W. H. Auden chided the “prudery” of “cultured people, to whom . . . theological terms were far more shocking than any of the four-letter words,” “whose childish memories associate religion with vague and pious verbiage.” Such “prudery” has only intensified in recent decades, especially among academics and intellectuals who assume that one cannot be a religious and a thinking person at the same time. Auden stands as an eloquent example of the joining of the two, a modern instance of a person in whom thought and faith not only coexisted, but nourished each other. His faith expanded the horizons of his mind as well as his heart, and his formidable intelligence, in turn, probed the nature and limits of his Christian belief, animating his continuous quest not only to believe still but also to believe again.
Auden praised Saint Augustine for showing that “the Christian faith can make sense of man’s private and social experience,” and he explained his own faith in those terms. He wrote that as distinct from the presuppositions of “a faith which applies to some specialized activity,” scientific research,
for example, “there is the Faith by which a man lives his life as a man, i.e. the presuppositions he holds in order that
1. he may make sense of his past and present experience;
2. he may be able to act toward the future with a sense that his actions will be meaningful and effective;
3. that he and his world may be able to be changed from what they are into something more satisfactory.

Владимир Соловьёв "Чтения о богочеловечестве"(Чтение первое).
".......Религия, говоря вообще и отвлеченно, есть связь человека и мира с безусловным началом и средоточием всего существующего. Очевидно, что если признавать действительность такого безусловного начала, то им должны определяться все интересы, все содержание человеческой жизни и сознания, от него должно зависеть и к нему относиться все существенное в том, что человек делает, познает и производит. Если допускать безусловное средоточие, то все точки жизненного круга должны соединяться с ним равными лучами. Только тогда является единство, цельность и согласие в жизни и сознании человека, только тогда все его дела и страдания в большой и малой жизни превращаются из бесцельных и бессмысленных явлений в разумные, внутренно необходимые события. Совершенно несомненно, что такое всеобъемлющее, центральное значение должно принадлежать религиозному началу, если вообще признавать его, и столь же несомненно, что в действительности для современного цивилизованного человечества, даже для тех в среде его, кто признает религиозное начало, религия не имеет этого всеобъемлющего и центрального значения. Вместо того чтобы быть всем во всем, она прячется в очень маленький и очень далекий уголок нашего внутреннего мира, является одним из множества различных интересов, разделяющих наше внимание..........."


Such a faith can only be held dogmatically, for in man’s historical and mortal existence, no experiment is ever identically repeatable.” These presuppositions informed Auden’s work as well as his life. In a talk at Columbia University in 1940, he remarked, “Art is not metaphysics . . . and the artist is usually unwise to insist too directly in his art upon his beliefs; but without an adequate and conscious metaphysics in the background, art’s imitation of life becomes, either a photostatic copy of the accidental details of life without pattern or significance, or a personal allegory of the artist’s individual dementia, of interest primarily to the psychologist and the historian.” For Auden this integrating metaphysics was the Anglo-Catholic faith.
Auden’s decision to write poetry was from the first associated with his faith. When he was fifteen years old, his friend Robert Medley attacked the Church while the two were walking together on a field near their school. Auden startled Medley by declaring that he was a believer. “An argument followed,” Medley recalled, “and to soften what I feared might become a serious breach, after a pause, I asked him if he wrote poetry, confessing by way of exchange, that I did. I was a little surprised that he had not tried and suggested he might do so.” Years later, Auden recollected the episode in “Letter to Lord Byron”:
Kicking a little stone, he turned to me
And said, “Tell me, do you write poetry?”
I never had, and said so, but I knew
That very moment what I wished to do.

четверг, 9 апреля 2015 г.

M. Heidegger "Introduction to Metaphysics" From "Translators' introduction" by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt

.... Because Heidegger places such a great emphasis on the importance of language for the question of Being and its history, the attentive reader should learn enough Heidegger's philosophical terminology to form a judgment concerning the best way to render Heidegger's key words in English. Because we have endeavored to maintain a high degree of terminological consistency in our translation, we hope this version of the Introduction to Metaphysics will aid this process of reflection. To assist the reader further, especially the reader who comes to Heidegger for the first time with this book, we offer here the brief discussion of important words in Heidegger's philosophical vocabulary, restricting ourselves to the most difficult and characteristic terms, used by Heidegger in this work. We also recommend a study of the more comprehensive glossary accompanying this translation. The reader must understand that what follow here are sketches, not definitions, and and that only closer study through an engaged process of familiarization can develop the fuller meaning of these words. There are no solutions to genuine problems of translation, only temporarily satisfactory placeholders for what thoughtful readers should themselves take up as a question about language.  

Das Seiende:  beings; what is; that which is.  Heidegger's  expression das Seiende is broad enough to refer to any entity, physical or otherwise, with which we may have dealings, whether real, illusory, or imagined. One helpful passage in this text suggest the range of things that may count as beings, including vehicles, mountains, insects, the Japanese, and Bach's fugues.  Das Seiende (or the equivalent Seiendes ) also often refers to beings in general and as a whole, as in the opening question of the book, "Why are there beings [ Seiendes ] at all instead of nothing?" It should be noted that the German expression, unlike the English "beings", is not plural, and is translated most literally as "what is" or "that which is". Occasionally, Heidegger refers to something as seiend, and we have translated this word as "in being". This is meant as a verbal adjective and does not mean located inside a being or thing. Finally, Seiendheit means "beingness", that which characterizes beings as beings, in general. For Heidegger, much of the history of philosophy has focused on this beingness rather than inquiring into the happening of Being itself.

Das Sein: For Heidegger, Being is not any thing. It is not a being at all. Introduction to Metaphysics often gives the impression that Being is the same as beingness. However, Heidegger's ultimate question is how it is that beings in their beingness become available to us in the first place, or how we come to understand what it means to be. The question of of Being, in this sense, inquires into the happening, the event, in which all beings in their beingness become accessible and understandable to us as beings. Being is thus essentially verbal and temporal. Literally translated, das Sein would be "the to be", but this would be far too clumsy a rendering. Among Heidegger scholars there is considerable controversy on how best to translate  das Sein into English. Many prefer the lowercase "being" in order to fend off the impression that Heidegger  means some Supreme Being standing above or holding up all other beings; das Sein must not be mistaken for a subject deserving the substantiation that capitalization can imply in English. (In German, all nouns are capitalized, so there is no such implication.) Still, in our judgement, to render das Sein as "being" risks confusion, especially with "beings" as the translation for das Seiende , and so we resort to the capitalized term.

Dasein: A word left untranslated in almost all renderings of Heidegger's work, Dasein denotes that being for whom Being itself is at issue, for whom Being is in question. For the most part, in Heidegger, this being is us, the human being, although Dasein is not equivalent to human beings; Heidegger insists that Dasein is not an anthropological, psychological, or biological concept. We can think of Dasein as a condition into which human beings enter, either individually or collectively, at a historical juncture when Being becomes an issue for them; in this sense, Heidegger often speaks in this text of "historical Dasein", "our Dasein", or "the Dasein of a people". In everyday German, the word Dasein is used just as we use the word "existence"; readers may always substitute "existence" for "Dasein" in order to get a sense of how Heidegger's statements would have sounded to his original audience. But Heidegger consistently sees the Latin term existentia as misleading and superficial, so it is preferable to interpret Dasein in terms of its root meaning. This root meaning is usually rendered in English as "Being there", but when Heidegger hyphenate  Da-sein, we have employed the equally valid translation "Being-here". Dasein is the being who inhabits a Here, a sphere of meaning within which beings can reveal themselves as meaningful, as significant.  

Das Nichts: Nothing. As the first sentence of Introduction to Metaphysics indicates, the question of "nothing" will be recurrent theme of this work. For Heidegger, there is a deep connection between das Nichts and das Sein, and once again, the reader must beware of taking the capitalized Nothing as substantive thing. Neither Being nor Nothing is a being for Heidegger. We have resorted to capitalization again to avoid confusion between Heidegger's use of das Nichts, which as Nothing is the counterpart to das Sein, Being, and his use of Nichts or nichts, without the article, which generally means "nothing" as employed in more ordinary language.

Gewalt: violence. Gewalt belongs to a family of words used in this work that present considerable difficulties for translation. In ordinary German, Gewalt can mean violence in the sense of arbitrary and willful force employed by the institutions of the state. We have decided to translate this word uniformly as "violence", in part for the sake of consistency, but also because Heidegger seems to want to underline the radically transformative work of the Gewalt-tat and the Gewalt-tatiger - the act of violence and the doer of violence - without minimizing the danger and even the terror of such work. Still, the reader should keep in mind the ambiguous meaning of Gewalt in German.

Walten; das Walten: hold sway; the sway. Related to Gewalt are the words walten (a verb) and das Walten ( a verbal noun). In ordinary German, walten means to prevail, to reign, to govern, to dominate.  Heidegger interprets the Greek word phusis, which is usually translated as "nature", as a Greek name for Being itself - that is, the "emergent-abiding Walten" of beings as such. We believe the expression"the sway" suggests this powerful upsurge of the presence of beings. That Heidegger seeks to interpret phusis as this "sway" is an undertaking to which the reader must lend special attention.

Grund: ground; reason; foundation. Like its English cognate, "ground", the German Grund  can mean both the earth beneath our feet and the reason upon which we establish a position. As such, ein Grund can be a foundation, and it is opposed to ein Abgrund, an abyss. We translate Grund and related words in a variety of ways, as indicated here, because no single English word can adequately capture its range of meaning.

Der Mensch: humanity; human beings; humans; the human being; the human. In German, Mensch means human being, irrespective of gender, and so, with a very few exceptions, we have sought to preserve this gender neutrality, especially because Heidegger discusses all human beings as Dasein.

Volk: a people; the people.  The German word Volk has troubled history. In official Nazi ideology, the Volk is the race, the bearer of a specific historical destiny, both biological and spiritual. But in ordinary German, Volk has no necessary connection with race. It can mean a people or a nation, or "the people" as the basis for sovereignty (as in the American "We the people"), although Volk usually does not mean "people" in the informal sense of "folks around here". Heidegger uses the word Volk in Being and Time, and there it is best translated as "community".  But in the 1930s, especially during his involvement with the Nazi regime, Heidegger discusses the Volk in a manner that clearly endeavors to come to grips, for better of worse, with the politics of his time.........

M. Heidegger "Introduction to Metaphysics"
 Мартин Хайдеггер "Введение в метафизику"

























четверг, 2 апреля 2015 г.

"The Unknown Citizen" by W.H. Auden

(To JS/07 M 378
This Marble Monument
Is Erected by the State)


He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be
One against whom there was no official complaint,
And all the reports on his conduct agree
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, he was a
saint,
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community.
Except for the War till the day he retired
He worked in a factory and never got fired,
But satisfied his employers, Fudge Motors Inc.
Yet he wasn’t a scab or odd in his views,
For his Union reports that he paid his dues,
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound)
And our Social Psychology workers found
That he was popular with his mates and liked a drink.
The Press are convinced that he bought a paper every day
And that his reactions to advertisements were normal in every way.
Policies taken out in his name prove that he was fully insured,
And his Health-card shows he was once in hospital but left it cured.
Both Producers Research and High-Grade Living declare
He was fully sensible to the advantages of the Instalment Plan
And had everything necessary to the Modern Man,
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a frigidaire.
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content
That he held the proper opinions for the time of year;
When there was peace, he was for peace: when there was war, he went.
He was married and added five children to the population,
Which our Eugenist says was the right number for a parent of his
generation.
And our teachers report that he never interfered with their
education.
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd:
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.